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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 78A-4-103(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Appellee takes exception to Appellant's framing of his issues 1 and 3.
Issue #1 as presented in Appellant's Brief states: "Whether the District Court
abused its discretion in finding that petitioner's debts incurred solely by herself
during the marriage, and without any knowledge, consent, input or control of the
respondent should be shared by the respondent," is misconstrued. The District Court
below did not make findings that would suggest these issue as presented by
Appellant. The issue is better stated as follows: Whether the District Court
correctly specified which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during the marriage.
Issue #3 as stated by Appellant is also not clear and misleading. It states:
"Whether the Court abused its discretion by finding that Appellant commingled
premarital financial accounts and cash gifts from his mother made during the
marriage with another account in which Appellant deposited traceable income
earned during the marriage and paid business operation expenses and personal living
expenses; and whether Appellant premarital accounts lost their identity and
character as separate property by temporarily depositing them into a joint account
1

with Appellee to protect them from seizure by his former spouse." The issue as
framed suggests that the District Court made it's findings based upon a commingling
of funds notion and therefore the accounts in question lost their identity as separate
property. As will be discussed below, the District Court did not base itfs findings on
a commingling theory but provided the basis of its findings only after a full, detailed
and careful analysis of the unraveling of the accounts in question. The District
Court was more specific and the issue is better stated as: Whether the District Court
correctly determined that the Investment and Retirement Accounts were subject to
division as marital property.
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES,
AND REGULATIONS WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE
There are no constitutional provisions, ordinances, or regulations that are
determinative of this case.
Statutes:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) (2010) provides, in relevant part:
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3(1) and (2) (2008) provides:
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate
Maintenance, or Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any
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action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or
division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs,
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to
enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include
provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony,
or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney
fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or
defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for
not awarding fees.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-11(4) (2010) provides:
(4) The right to the use of water evidenced by shares of stock in a corporation shall
not be deemed appurtenant to land.
Rules:
Utah Rule Of Civil Procedure Rule 26.
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may
be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.
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(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered b\ the court, this
disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to
provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party
regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report
prepared and signed by the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject
matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for
each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid
for the study and testimony; and a listing ot any other cases in which the witness has
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
(a)(3)(c) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the
expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is
intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified
by another party under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 days after the disclosure made by
the other party.

UTAH RULES ()¥ EVIDENCE
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
4

(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and
supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity
to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter
noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial
notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall
instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact
judicially noticed.
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Rule 614. Calling and interrogation of witnesses In i oiirl
(a) Calling by court. The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a
party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus
called.
(b) Interrogation by court. The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by
itself or by a party.
( c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation
by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is
not present.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 15, 2010 arising from a
two-day bench trial in a divorce proceeding before Judge Robert K. Hilder, Third
District Court, Salt Lake County. Thefindingsof fact issued by the ( uiirt on July 2,
2010 was reduced to afinaldivorce decree that was entered on July 15, 2010.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Both parties are 73 years old, having met in high school but not marrying until
later in life (R. 20). Each party has two previous marriages and lived with each
other since 1999 (R. 21; Findings, 1). Appellant divorced from his second wife in
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January 2002 and the parties married May 20, 2002 (Findings, 2). The parties
separated January 15, 2008 and the marriage lasted 5 years and 8 months (Findings,
6).
During the proceeding the District Court Judge reviewed and took judicial
notice of a 42 page Davis County docket of Appellant's prior divorce with his
second wife (Findings, 8; R. 299-304, 346, 347, 350,351). The court did so after
hearing testimony of his previous marriage and his attempt to shield his assets.
There was never an objection made by Appellant over this Judicial Notice or the
questioning that followed by the District Court Judge.

Based upon testimony given

by the parties the court found that Appellant had actively taken steps to protect his
financial interests in his previous marriage and the current marriage of the parties
that went well beyond legitimacy. According to the District Court, it was clear from
the Davis County Docket and Appellant's own testimony that he was willing to
undertake acts that included deception to shield assets (Findings, 9; R. 300, 346,
347). Appellant claimed he had to protect his assets due to a difficult second
marriage and that that was evidence that he had to do so in the present marriage as
well. The court disagreed and indicated that Appellant understood other options
such as a pre- or post-marital agreement but no such written agreement was provided
(Findings, 10;R. 350).
The court found that Appellant maintained his own funds in the name of his
elderly mother, Lorena Liston, at Barnes Bank and that none of those funds
7

belonged to his mother (R. 299-303).

These fictitious accounts were the primary

accounts that Appellant used during the course of the present marriage with
Appellee to obscure and shield his financial dealings and to avoid judgment
collection (R. 346-347). Appellant routinely deposited earnings from consulting as
an engineer into this account, said deposits being marital earnings (Findings, 11; R.
348, 349, 422).
During the course of the marriage the parties used separate accounts, but the
court found that the fact that they may have had separate accounts does not mean
that the parties finances were not combined in substantial ways. For example, both
had separate credit cards but both cards were used to purchase the entire range of
marital goods and expenses (Findings, 12; R. 117-120, 183, Petitioner's Ex. 54, 55).
Further, the court found that the Appellee left the marriage with $30,500 of debt and
that the debt related to family expenses that was unpaid at the time of separation.
The two credit cards in question total approximately $30,500.00 (Petitioner's Ex. 54,
55). There was no evidence to suggest that the debt was for the sole benefit of
Appellee (Findings, 13). The court found that the Appellant did not identify debts to
be allocated but that the Appellee did support her claim of $30,500 of marital debt
and that these debts were not for her exclusive benefit nor were they used without
marital benefit. Moreover, Appellee did not have the income to support many of
these expenditures (Finding, pp. 11; R. 117-120,183,293,294; Petitioner's Ex 54).
The court further found that many of the day-to-day expenses, including food,
8

entertainment, use of and gas for the car, Christmas for the families, and travel
where substantially paid by Appellee and therefore the court found that $30,500 of
debt was marital and should be shared equally between the parties (Findings, p. 12;
R. 117-120, 183, Petitioner's Ex. 54, 55).
The court found that the parties had obtained a marital residence and that
residence was the subject of a mediation agreement between the parties, Appellee
having giving up her equity for payment of $10,000 ®. 65; Petitioner's Ex 16).
During the course of the marriage the parties also subdivided their real property and
sold off a portion of the property to maximize its value (Findings pp 8-10). The real
property also included shares in Holliday Water Company, one of the shares the
court found to be appurtenant to the property. Subsequent to the subdividing of the
property, 4 water shares from Holliday Water Company existed and related to the
real property. Based upon the testimony of the manager of Holliday Water
Company, which the court found to be persuasive, the court found that only one of
the 4 shares was appurtenant to the property, that share having been tied to a single
meter on the property which is necessary for the property to receive culinary water
(Findings, pp. 10; R. 68, 70, 73, 239, 243, 244, 246, 247; Petitioner's Ex 17). The
other 3 shares were valued at $5000 each (total value $15,000) and the court found
that the real value was in order to obtain new service to a new meter and not to
obtain additional water without charge (Findings pp. 10-11). The court further
determined that these 3 shares were not the subject of the mediation agreement
9

between the parties for the satisfaction of Appellees interest in the real property and
that Appellant could either pay Appellee $7500 or could transfer her 1 share and pay
her $2500 (Findings, pp. 11; R. 68).
The Appellant accumulated and held money over the years and the course of
the marriage with Fidelity Investments. Appellant was gainfully employed during
the marriage but was rather reluctant to say that the monies in Fidelity Accounts
came from income while working ( R. 51-52, 348,349,357,383,422). He provided
no evidence as to the source of those funds (R. 357, 383 422,425, 427,428,431).
The money found in Barnes Bank which showed numerous transactions had nothing
to do with his mother Lorena Liston but were a fiction created by Appellant to avoid
judgment collection ( R. 427-431). The Barnes account shrunk because the majority
of the money went to Fidelity (R. 431). The Appellant failed to bring evidence such
as taxes to show his income or gifts from his mother as he claimed ®. 446). During
the marriage accounts were closed, funds transferred, and combined causing the
court to have to "unravel" what is separate and marital property in this divorce
(Findings, p. 14).
The court was aided by an expert, Rebecca Schreyer, CPA, and also used it's
own analysis (R. 202-235). The court concluded that the CPA letter of December
18,2009, provided the best starting point (Findings, p. 14; Petitioner's Ex 28). This
letter was prepared after she reviewed the voluminous financial statements from
Fidelity (R. 207).
10

The court agreed with the expert's analysis that the IRA rollover account
ending in account number 3460 was Appellant's premarital property and his sole
property (Findings, pp. 14-15; R. 208; Petitioner's Ex. 30). The court also agreed
with the with the expert CPA that the amounts found in account ending in numbers
5706 and having a balance of $72,065.66, were also premarital property but were
added to during the marriage (R. 209; Petitioner's Ex 31). The court stated that
there could have been an argument as to this particular account 5706 and the amount
therein could be considered marital, since subsequent activity could be seen as
converting it to marital property, but Appellee did not urge this strongly and the
court prudently fore bore from this equitable approach (Findings, p. 15).
Starting in on October 30, 2002, however, marital funds were added during
the marriage to this 5706 account (Findings, p. 15). Appellant claimed the additions
came from his mother but offered no evidence of this statement (R. 338-341, 343,
344-345). Appellant further stated he was not sure of the source of funds (R. 357).
Appellant stated he transferred accounts as a diversionary tactic to protect his money
(R. 345). The court stated that even if it believed the money might have been a
separate gift, subsequent actions involving this account, combined with the lack of
evidence regarding the source of the funds, persuaded the court that the all of these
amounts should be treated as marital funds (Findings, p. 15). With the additions, the
account grew to $161, 984.31 and that amount was transferred to another account in
it's entirety to an account ending with number 3162 which was in Appellees sole
11

name (Findings, p. 16; R. 210), This transfer occurred in June 1, 2004, and about 6
months later the money in account 3162 was again transferred to an account ending
in numbers 7442, which the Appellant opened in his mothers name (R. 212;
Petitioner's Ex 35). The court found it was not Appellant's mother's money as
Appellant had claimed, but instead another device to protect his accounts either from
his second wife or the Appellee (Findings 16).
The court further focused on this account ending in numbers 7442 (Findings,
p. 16). The amount transferred in January 2005 from account 3162, which was in
Appellee's sole, name to Lorena Liston's sole name account 7442 was $169,415.85
(Findings, p. 16). Account 7442 was opened in November 2004 with a $30,000
deposit, the deposit from a Lorena Liston account that the court had found was held
solely by Appellant and was not for Lorena (R. 338-341). No evidence was shown
to the contrary by Appellant (R. 343). This account was used by Appellant to
channel all of his income and expenses, including marital earning, which were
substantial during this period of time (Findings, pp. 16-17). From the Lorena Liston
account which reached $397,334.89, all monies were again transferred into Sergay
Liston's sole account ( R. 217). The court did not have any doubt that the $30,000
that funded the Lorena Liston account initially, and subsequent account deposits in
the total of $95,000 were comprised of marital money (Findings, p. 17). The only
difference that the court had with the expert CPA was an apparent omission of
$5,000 business account deposit. The court further noted that none of the accounts
12

discussed at this point were retirement accounts except the account previously
determined to be separate property (Findings, p. 17; R. 210-217).
The CPA testified that a great deal of money came into the Fidelity Accounts
subsequent to the sale of the marital property subdivision in 2005. For example, in
April 2005 prior to the close of the marital property subdivision the Barnes Bank
Account was just $4,000. In May 2005, after the close of the property the account
grew to $160,964.48 due to the sale of the subdivision (R. 431; Ex 27, 40). She
recognized these as proceeds from the sale. There was also over $345,000 placed
into Barnes Bank in just 10 bank statements alone ( R. 428). They had nothing to do
with his mother Lorena (R. 429). At one point during the marriage the accounts
grew to $613,577.93 (R. 222).
The court then came to another difference with the expert CPA. The expert
CPA identified an account ending in numbers 2680 as a retirement account opened
on April 1, 2002, with a balance of $123,215.12. The CPA looked at a deposit in
November 2006 and a transfer to an account 5584 in December 2007 and assumed
that the entire marital portion of the IRA account 2680 was transferred into account
5584. The CPA then identified a balance of $24,924.97 which was transferred in
March 2008 to account 5385 which was the last account that appears to have held
funds based upon evidence presented at trial (Findings, p. 17). After hearing all the
evidence provided by the parties the court found that the funds held in the account
ending in 2680 and the transactions discussed by the expert CPA did not in fact
13

constitute either receipt or transfer of marital funds. The account was determined to
be the sole account of Appellant and the $24,924.97 transfer into account 5584 his
sole property (Findings, p. 18).
Based upon the court's analysis, the court adjusted the CPA calculation found
on page 2 of her expert letter (See Petitioner's Ex 28), by deducting $19,924.97 from
the balance in account 5585. The sum was reached by the court by subtracting
$24,924.97 and adding $5000 from the business check deposit during the course of
the marriage and discussed above that was not in the expert CPA's calculations
(Findings, p. 18). One more adjustment was made. The court deducted $97,027
premarital value resulting in a marital interest at the time of separation in the amount
of $273,563 but the court further reduced the amount by $513. The reason for the
final deduction is that the CPA analysis included growth in the fund. The court
applied a percentage of the total that included growth and determined the difference
between the growth on the account determined by the expert CPA ($293,558) and
the amount determined by the court ($273,050).
Many deposits were made into the Fidelity accounts after the sale of the
marital subdivision that was partitioned off from the marital home (R. 160, 211,214,
431).
Based upon it's thorough and careful analysis, the court determined that
Appellee's portion of thefinancialaccounts was $136,525 (Findings p. 18).
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The court found as to attorney fees, that based upon the awards set forth in it's
Ruling and Order that it did not find that either party had an inability to pay fees
incurred. The court did find however that based upon the issue of fault, primarily
Appellant's ongoing and blatant attempts to hide assets, confuse financial
transactions, and otherwise be accountable for his court ordered and marital
obligations, an award of fees was appropriate. The point of the award in the court's
view was that Appellant had made the case much more difficult than it should have
been (R. 159, 164; Findings 23).The amount given was conservative given the
complexity of the case that should have been much more simple. The court found
that $5,000 to be given to Appellants attorney was fair and equitable considering the
many hours of extra work that went into bringing this matter to conclusion
(Findings, 23).
From the Findings and Order counsel for Appellee prepared a Decree of
Divorce.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court correctly and equitably specified which party is responsible
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties that were
contracted or incurred during the marriage. The evidence was presented and the trial
judge should be given great deference in the findings of fact and should not be
overturned as they are not clearly erroneous.
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The District Court also ruled correctly and was within its discretion when it
equitably awarded the additional water shares between the parties and its decision
should be upheld.
The District Court correctly determined which investments and retirement
accounts were marital property and divided them equitably between the parties. The
trial court should be given considerable discretion concerning this property division
and the court's actions enjoy a presumption of validity and are not erroneous.
The District Court handled itself appropriately throughout the trial and with
the upmost courtesy when it interrogated Appellant after taking judicial notice of a
prior divorce action in Davis County. The Appellant should be held responsible for
his actions.
Lastly, the District Court correctly awarded Appellee's Attorney fees based on
the issue of fault of Appellant's ongoing and blatant attempt to hide assets, confuse
financial transactions, and otherwise avoid being accountable for his court ordered
marital obligations. The Appellant made this case much more difficult than it should
have been.
ARGUMENT
POINT L THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY SPECIFIED WHICH
PARTY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBTS.
OBLIGATIONS. OR LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES CONTRACTED OR
INCURRED DURING THE MARRIAGE.
Appellate courts give great deference to the trial court's findings of fact in
divorce cases and will not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. See,
16

Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, If 14, 217 P.3d 733; Thompson v. Thompson,
2009 UT App 101, f 10, 208 P.3d 539; Leppert v. L^pperf, 2009 UT App 10, If 8,
200 P.3d 223; Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, f 9, 176 P.3d 476;
Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, f 18, 9 P.3d 171. A finding of fact will be
adjudged clearly erroneous if it violates the standards set by the appellate court; is
against the clear weight of the evidence; or the reviewing court is left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, although there is evidence to
support the finding. See, Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ^ 14; Shinkoskey v.
Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 10 n.5, 19 P.3d 1005; Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, f
18.
In divorce proceedings, the trial court is given considerable discretion in
fashioning an equitable property distribution, and its findings will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion." Carlton v. Carlton,! 56 P.2d 86, 87 (Utah
Ct.App.1988). In that case the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
The trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to do
so constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment. In addition, the findings must be sufficiently detailed and consist
of enough subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court took to reach its
conclusion on each factual issue presented.
Id. at 87-88.
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Here, the District Court's division of debt determination explains a clear
factual basis and analysis supporting its determinations on the marital debt and
provides this appellate court with enough information to allow meaningful review.
Appellee presented evidence regarding the balances on her credit cards. (R.
178; Ex. 54, 55.) During the course of the marriage the parties used separate
accounts, but the court found that the fact that they may have had separate accounts
did not mean that the parties finances were not combined in substantial ways. For
example, both had separate credit cards but both cards were used to purchase the
entire range of marital goods and expenses (Findings, 12; R. 117-120, 183,
Petitioner's Ex. 54, 55). Further, the court found that the Appellee left the marriage
with $30,500 of debt and that the debt related to family expenses that was unpaid at
the time of separation. The two credit cards in question total approximately
$30,500.00 (Petitioner's Ex. 54, 55). There was no evidence to suggest that the debt
was for the sole benefit of Appellee (Findings, 13). The court stated that
"[petitioner did not have the income to support many of the expenses she was called
upon to pay during the marriage. It is true that petitioner terminated full-time work,
and cut back substantially on her part-time working activities, but at the time of the
marriage each of the parties was 65 years old." (Findings, 11). The trial judge is in
the best position to make this decision and his broad powers of discretion should be
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supported. It would be unfair to the parties and the judge if a review of each
transaction that occurred in the marriage had to be individually reviewed.
Appellee testified she incurred credit card debt to pay for meals out together,
groceries, things for the house, use and gas for the car, clothing, and two trips to see
her dying father and his funeral. (R. 118-119, 183) She also testified she paid for all
the parties' food. (R. 280). The court found that "[d]uring the marriage, petitioner
paid for many day-to-day expenses, including food, entertainment, Christmas for
families, and travel." (Findings, 11.) Appellee testified that both she and Appellant
received benefits through these credit charges. (R. 118-19.) Appellee testified that
between $30,000 and $35,000 of her current debt was incurred during the marriage.
( R. 281-83.) The court found that Appellee had established debts of at least
$30,500, which debts constituted "a marital obligation, to be shared equally."
(Findings, 12.)
To suggest, as the Appellant is suggesting, that he was in a "powerless and
ignorant position" and should therefore not be held jointly liable for debts incurred
during a marriage by a spouse who was "concealing" the use of their individual
credit account makes absolutely no sense unless you are either trying to delay or
avoid payment of a debt or unaware of where the food you are eating came from.
Did he not eat the food as she paid for it at the restaurant? He is not an "innocent
bystander" as he suggests. He was her husband and if he had any evidence of this
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victimization as he suggests, he should have brought the evidence to trial. He did
not.
As a review of the record reveals there was no contrary evidence to rebut
Appellee's testimony put forth by Appellant. The trial court's decision should be
affirmed.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY AND WAS WITHIN
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT EQUITABLY AWARDED THE ADDITIONAL
WATER SHARES TO THE PARTIES,
The court found that the parties had obtained a residence during the marriage
and that residence was the subject of a mediation agreement between the parties,
Appellee having giving up her equity for payment of $10,000 ®. 65; Petitioner's Ex
16). During the course of the marriage, the parties also subdivided the real property
that the marital home was situated on and sold off a portion of the property to
maximize its value (Findings pp 8-10). The real property also included 4 shares in
Holliday Water Company, one of which shares the court found to be appurtenant to
the property. Based upon the testimony of the manager of Holliday Water Company,
Marlin K. Sundberg, which the court found to be persuasive, the court found that
only one of the 4 shares was appurtenant to the property, that share having been tied
to a single meter on the property which is necessary for the property to receive
culinary water (Findings, pp. 10; R. 68, 70, 73, 239, 243, 244, 246, 247; Petitioner's
Ex 17). Mr. Marlin Sundberg of the Holliday Water Company testified that the
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company sells water shares for $59000.00 each. (R. 247.) The court found that the
real value was in order to obtain new service to a new meter and not to obtain
additional water without charge (Findings pp. 10-11). Marlin Sundberg testified that
the other shares could be sold. (R. 70, 242-43.) One share "is tied to the single
meter on the property . . . and is absolutely necessary to permit the property owner to
receive culinary water from the Holliday Water Company" (Findings, 10).
The court further determined that these 3 shares were not the subject of the
mediation agreement between the parties for the satisfaction of Appellees interest in
the real property and that Appellant could either pay Appellee $7500 or could
transfer her 1 share and pay her $2500 (Findings, pp. 11; R. 68).
Mr. Sundberg's testimony and the Judge's Findings are supported by Utah
law. In Utah Code Annotated Section 73-1-11 (4) it reads in pertinent part:
(4) The right to the use of water evidenced by shares of stock in a corporation shall
not be deemed appurtenant to land.
Mr. Sundberg testified that only one water share was appurtenant to the land
and needed to remain with the meter. The other shares were freely transferable.
While it is true that under Utah law, a stipulation reached by divorcing
spouses regarding property division should be recognized and enforced by the courts
(Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 30 216, 3, 138 P.3d 63 (slip op.) (noting that spouses
have general authority "to arrange property rights by contract.") (quoting Reese v.
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Reese, 1999 UT 75, 24, 984 P.2d 987)), what Appellee was transferring was the real
property and the 1 appurtenant share of water, not the other shares that were freely
transferable under Utah law and according Mr. Sundberg.
The court was within its discretion to divide the other 3 shares of water as it
did.
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED WHICH
INVESTMENT AND RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS WERE SUBJECT TO
MARITAL PROPERTY.
A trial court has considerable discretion concerning property [division] in a
divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity" Jensen v.
Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, t6,203 P.3d 1020 (quoting Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App
83, f 17, 45 P.3d 176). On appeal, we therefore " will not disturb a property award
unless we determine that there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the
law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further,"
[w]e review the legal adequacy of findings of fact for correctness as a question of
law."M
Stated another way, when reviewing a district court's findings of fact on
appeal, we do not undertake an independent assessment of the evidence presented
during the course of trial and reach our own separate findings with respect to that
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evidence. Rather, we endeavor only to evaluate whether the court's findings are so
lacking in support that they are against the clear weight of the evidence. 438 Main
St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, f 75, 99 P.3d 801.
In this case, the trial court's findings are not so lacking in support as to be
clearly erroneous. Indeed, the Appellee was forced to go on an unnecessary and
expensive discovery journey to just get to the bottom of Appellant's finances which
were more complicated and voluminous than reasonably necessary. In a bench trial
or other proceeding in which the judge serves as fact finder, the court has
considerable discretion to assign relative weight to the evidence before it. This
discretion includes the right to minimize or even disregard certain evidence. State v.
Comer, 2002 UT App 219,115, 51 P.3d 55. There is ample evidence supporting
this finding of the trial court that Appellee's portion of these marital accounts was
$136,525 (Findings p. 18). For instance, The Appellant accumulated and held money
prior to and during the course of the marriage with Fidelity Investments and Barnes
Bank. Appellant was gainfully employed during the marriage but was rather
reluctant to say that the monies in Fidelity Accounts came from income while
working (R. 51-52, 348, 349, 357, 383,422). He was employed by Conestoga Cold
Storage as late as late 2007 although he had testified earlier it was 2005 (R. 425).
The trial court also specifically found that Appellant had taken steps to hide
accounts from his former and current wife (R. 344, 345, 427-431).
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He provided

no evidence as to the source of those funds ( R. 357, 383 422,425, 427,428,431).
The money found in Barnes Bank which showed numerous transactions had nothing
to do with his mother Lorena Liston but were a fiction created by Appellant to avoid
judgment collection (R. 427-431). Further, the Barnes account shrunk because the
majority of the money went to Fidelity ( R. 431). The Appellant failed to bring
evidence such as taxes to show his income or gifts from his mother that he claimed (
R. 446). During the marriage accounts were closed, funds transferred, and
combined causing the court to have to "unravel" what is separate and marital
property in this divorce (Findings, p. 14).
Due to the complicated financial structure of the Appellant's accounts, the
court was aided by an expert, Rebecca Schreyer, CPA, and also used it's own
analysis (R. 202-235). The court concluded that the CPA letter of December 18,
2009, provided the best starting point (Findings, p. 14; Petitioner's Ex 28). This
letter was prepared after she reviewed the voluminous financial statements from
Fidelity ( R. 207). The CPA was retained pursuant to a Court Order that was signed
November 23, 2009, and entered November 30, 2009. That Order resulted from a
Stipulation entered by the parties (See Attached, November 30, 2009 Order). To the
knowledge of Appellant and a thorough review of the Record there was never an
objection to the CPA, nor to her Report. Further, to now suggest that it is a violation
of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3), is not true either. She was Stipulated to by
the parties and Court Ordered which is an exception to Rule 26 that is now being
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announced by Appellant (See Addendum, Court Order of November 30, 2009
attached). Further, the Report was delivered to Appellant's counsel and he even
corresponded with the expert ( Ex. 28, 29). It is also a stretch, as Appellant has
suggested, that she claimed she was not an expert (See Appellant's Brief, p. 35).
What the record states is that she did not consider herself an "expert at being an
expert witness" (R. 236). It was an attempt by the witness to be self-deprecating.
The Court felt she enunciated the rules of marital distribution well (R. 237). In any
event, what is true, Appellant agreed to admit the Report and Appellant never
objected to that Report or her being an expert witness (R. 131, 227).
In many instances, the court agreed with Appellant. The court agreed with the
expert's analysis that the IRA rollover account ending in account number 3460 was
Appellant's premarital property and his sole property (Findings, pp. 14-15; R. 208;
Petitioner's Ex. 30). The court also agreed with the CPA that the amounts found in
the account ending in numbers 5706 and having a balance of $72,065.66, was also
premarital property but was added to during the marriage (R. 209; Petitioner's Ex
31-53). The court stated that there was an argument as to this 5706 account that it
was marital since subsequent activity could be seen as converting it to marital
property, but that Appellee did not urge this strongly and the court prudently fore
bore from using this equitable approach (Findings, p. 15). The Appellant's
argument seems to be stuck on this point, and goes on into detail about commingling
of accounts, but this is not the basis for the court's findings.
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In October 30, 2002, marital funds were added to the account 5706 (Findings,
p. 15; R., 210). Ten thousand dollars in 2002, $63,000.00 in July 2003, $4500.00 in
March of 2004. The account grew during the marriage to $163,219.18 (R. 210). In
account ending 7442, the Lorena K. Liston account, deposits were made of $115,000
(R. 214). Appellant claimed the additions came from his mother but offered no
evidence of this statement (R. 338-341,343,344-345). He continues this theory in
his current brief. But as was found in court, Appellant stated he was not sure of the
source of funds (R. 357). At one point, the Appellant claimed none of his earnings
went into the accounts (R. 348). But once pushed on the subject he admitted he did
put money in those accounts during the marriage (R. 349). Most unusual was his
admission in court that he transferred accounts as a diversionary tactic to protect his
money( R. 345).
With additions, the 5706 account grew to $161,984.31 and that amount was
transferred to another account in it's entirety to an account ending with number 3162
which was in Appellees sole name (Findings, p. 16; R. 210), This transfer occurred
in June 1, 2004, and about 6 months later the money in account 3162 was again
transferred to an account ending in numbers 7442, which the Appellant opened in
his mothers name (R. 212; Petitioner's Ex 35). The court found it was not
Appellant's mother's money as Appellant had claimed, but instead another device to
protect his accounts either from his second wife or the Appellee. The court further
focused on this account ending in numbers 7442 (Findings, p. 16). The amount
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transferred in January 2005 from account 3162 which was in Appellee's sole name to
Lorena Listonfs sole name account 7442 was $169,415.85 (Findings, p. 16). Account
7442 was opened in November 2004 with a $30,000 deposit from a Lorena Liston
account that the court had found was held by solely by Appellant and was not for
Lorena ( R. 338-341). No evidence was shown to the contrary by Appellant (R.
343). This account was an account that Appellant channeled all of his income and
expenses, including marital earnings, which were substantial during this period of
time (Findings, pp. 16-17). From the Lorena Liston account which reached
$397,334.89, all monies were again transferred into Sergay Listonfs sole account ®.
217). The court did not have any doubt that the $30,000 that funded the Lorena
Liston account initially, and subsequent account deposits in the total of $95,000
comprised of marital money (Findings, p. 17). The only difference that the court had
with the expert CPA was an apparent omission of $5,000 business account deposit.
The court further noted that none of the accounts discussed at this point were
retirement accounts except the account previously determined to be separate
property (Findings, p. 17; 210-217).
The CPA testified that a great deal of money came into the Fidelity accounts
subsequent to the sale of the marital property subdivision in 2005. In April of 2005,
prior to the close of the marital property subdivision the Barnes Bank Account was
just $4,000. In May 2005, after the close of the property the account grew to
$160,964.48 due to the sale of the subdivision (R. 431; Ex 27, 40). She testified
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that she "recognized that there were proceeds from the sale of the property that
would have funded a lot of the deposits that were made into this account that I've
allocated to deposits made during the marriage/' ( R. 225).
There were over $345,000 placed into Barnes Bank during the marriage in
just 10 bank statements alone (R. 428). They had nothing to do with his mother
Lorena (R. 429). At one point, the actual value of the fidelity accounts totaled
$613,577.93, the marital portion being less ( R. 222)
In April of 2005, the Barnes Bank balance was $4,000.00. But upon the sale
of the subdivision property in May 2005 that balance jumped to $160,964.48 due to
the sale of the subdivision (R. 431; Ex. 27, 40) The balance dropped significantly
shortly after because the money went in the Fidelity Accounts and Appellant admits
this (R. 431).
The court then came to another difference with the expert CPA. The expert
CPA identified an account ending in numbers 2680 as a retirement account opened
on April 1, 2002 with a balance of $123,215.12. The CPA looked at a deposit in
November 2006 and a transfer to an account 5584 in December 2007 and assumed
that the entire marital portion of the IRA account 2680 was transferred into account
5584. The CPA then identified a balance of $24,924.97 which was transferred in
March 2008 to account 5385 which was the last account that appears to have held
funds based upon evidence presented at trial (Findings, p. 17). After hearing all the
evidence provided by the parties the court found that the funds held in the account
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ending in 2680 and the transactions discussed by the expert CPA did not in fact
constitute either receipt or transfer of marital funds. The account was determined to
be the sole account of Appellant and the $24,924.97 transfer into account 5584 his
sole property (Findings, p. 18; R. 217).
To suggest as Appellant does that Appellee does not have a marital portion in
these accounts flies in the face of reason. While on one hand, the Appellant
concedes that earnings during the marriage in his Mountain Lion Engineering
business was marital property, he forgets to mention that the greatest source of funds
accumulated in Fidelity were from the sale of the marital subdivisions that was
partitioned off from the marital home (R. 160, 211,214, 431). Those amounts went
into Fidelity. Those amounts were identified and were marital. They bought the
property together when married and worked on the subdivision together during the
marriage. Appellant wants it all and does not share well, plain and simple. Perhaps
he should have had a pre- or post-marital agreement which he was familiar with (R.
349).
Based upon the court's analysis, the court adjusted the CPA calculation found
on page 2 of her expert letter (See Petitioner's Ex 28), by deducting $19,924.97 from
the balance in account 5585. The sum was reached by the court by subtracting
$24,924.97 and adding $5000 from the business check deposit during the course of
the marriage and discussed above that was not in the expert CPAfs calculations
(Findings, p. 18). One more adjustment was made. The court deducted $97,027
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premarital value resulting in a marital interest at the time of separation in the amount
of $273,563 but the court further reduced the amount by $513. The reason for the
final deduction is that the CPA analysis included growth in the fund. The court
applied a percentage of the total that included growth and determined the difference
between the growth on the account determined by the expert CPA ($293,558) and
the amount determined by the court (273,050). Finally, based upon it's thorough
and careful analysis, the court determined that Appellee's portion of the financial
accounts was $136,525 (Findings p. 18).
Appellant's commingling diatribe misses the point that the court made in its
findings. The court's analysis is much more than a discussion on commingling. It is
an extensive, time consuming and accurate Findings. To further suggest that there
was no evidence to identify the source of funds that were deposited during the
marriage, other than Appellant's own testimony, and that they were gifts from his
mother and in making numerous transactions of the same funds (which were
admittedly appreciating over time) into different accounts to protect them from
garnishment by his former wife, and that Appellee did not meet her burden of proof,
make little sense. Appellant was employed and they bought and sold property that
they worked on together during the marriage. If his elderly mother gave him money
as he claimed, he clearly never showed any proof of it to the court.
With these facts in mind, as well as the deferential standard of review, see,
e.g., Leppert v. Leppert, 2009 UT App 10, f 9, 200 P.3d 223 (mWe afford the trial
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court considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, and its
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.m (quoting Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT
App 282, <h 7, 76 P.3d 716)); Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, f 44,
176 P.3d 476 ("We defer to the trial court in its findings of fact related to property
valuation and distribution."), we cannot say that the trial court's fair, thorough and
reasonable findings are clearly erroneous and it must be upheld.

POINT IV, THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY INTERROGATED
THE APPELLANT AFTER TALKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE
APPELLANTS PRIOR DIVORCE ACTION IN DAVIS COUNTY.

The trial court asserted "judicial notice" as its basis for independently
obtaining the court docket in Appellant's prior divorce case in the Second District
Court for Davis, County and referring to it while questioning the Appellant while he
was on the witness stand. (See Utah R. Evid. 201 (stating the rule for judicial
notice)). While it is true that neither counsel for the parties had provided this
information to the court beforehand, nor was counsel for either party given any
advance notice by the court that it was conducting its own discovery into Appellant's
prior divorce action and would refer to it, it is also true that there was absolutely no
request or objection to the court to be heard by Appellant under Rule 201. The Rule
states in pertinent part(s):
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
31

tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken...
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
Ironically, the court was tipped off by Appellant's own testimony of avoiding
judgments in Davis County (R. 299-301) and became puzzled by his answers (R.
301). The judge very astutely went online with the court's computer and pulled the
docket from Davis County while Appellant's testimony continued. The judge did
not ask about the Davis Court Docket action until approximately a half an hour later
at which time he questioned Appellant about his previous divorce and statements
(R. 346, 347). Appellant, as opposed to what his brief says, was afforded the
opportunity to look at the Docket (R. 347). Further, no objection was made.
Rule 614 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Rule 614. Calling and interrogation of witnesses by court
(a) Calling by court. The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a
party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus
called.
(b) Interrogation by court. The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by
itself or by a party.
( c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation
by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is
not present.
Appellant argues that the trial judge abandoned its role as an impartial
adjudicator by questioning him. Because Appellant did not object to the court's
questioning, he must demonstrate plain error on appeal. See State v. Kell, 2002 UT
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106,^[ 45, 61 P.3d 1019 ("Because defendant did not object to the comments during
the trial, we review this issue for plain error."); see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) (stating to establish plain error a defendant must show: "(I)
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful").
Under rule 614(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, "[t]he court may interrogate
witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party." In this case, the trial court
questioned Appellant about the Davis County divorce where he was also hiding
funds from a former wife's judgment (Findings p. 16; R346, 347).
The court questioned Appellant to help clarify perhaps whether Appellant's
earlier testimony was credible or showed a pattern of deceit. "It is within the judge's
prerogative to 'ask whatever questions of witnesses as in his judgment is necessary
or desirable to clarify, explain or add to the evidence as it relates to the disputed
issues/ " State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 553 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (quoting State v.
Mellen, 583 P.2d 46, 48 (Utah 1978)).
Further, even if it was error for the trial court to solicit testimony from
Appellant, the error was harmless. "If the error was harmless, that is, if the error
was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected
the outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order.1" Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v.
Harrison, 2003 UT 14,1 22, 70 P.3d 35 . In this case, the trial court's questioning of
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Appellant (without a jury) is "sufficiently inconsequential," id., and does not warrant
reversal. It is true that the judge mentions this testimony from the colloquy in its
findings, but it is not plain error. From the Findings it is clear that the court relied
on numerous grounds for its decision including credibility determination about
Appellant. Indeed, the court weighed all the evidence and noted Appellant's pattern
and method of hiding money. Moreover, Appellant's use of a 1989 7th Circuit
opinion that relates to judicial notice should not be seen by this court as controlling.
Because evidence for the court's credibility determination was ample in many
areas and the court did not rely solely on the disputed portion of Appellant's
testimony, Appellant's plain error argument fails.
POINT V, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED APPELLEE
ATTORNEY FEES.
The trial court's division of debts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
Connellv. Cornell, 2010 UT App 139, f 8, 233 P.3d 836. Similarly, an appellate
court will "review a trial court's decision regarding attorney fees in a divorce
proceeding for an abuse of discretion." Id. f 6.
The court found that "based on the issues of fault, primarily respondent's
ongoing and blatant attempt to hide assets, confuse financial transactions, and
otherwise avoid being accountable for his court ordered marital obligations, an
award of fees is appropriate. The point of the award is that in the Court's view,
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respondent has made this case much more difficult than it should have been."
(Findings, 23)
The court found "that it is completely fair and equitable that respondent be
required to pay the sum of $5,000 to petitioner's attorney as partial compensation for
the many hours of work and effort that have gone into bringing this matter to
conclusion." (Findings, 23; R. 159, 164),
As opposed to what Appellant is stating, the court found that he did have
resources to pay an award and judgment of attorney fees (Findings 23).
Appellant relies upon Utah Code section 30-3-3 which generally governs
awards of attorney fees in domestic actions. In provides that a trial court may order
a party to pay costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert feed, of the
other party. See, e.g., Rhen v. Rhen, 1999 UT App 41, f 22, 974 P.2d 306 (M[A]n
award [of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code section 30-3-3] must be based on
sufficient findings addressing the financial need of the recipient spouse; the ability
of the other spouse to pay; and the reasonableness of the fees.").
Here, the record indicates that the district court did not award attorney fees
pursuant to Utah Code Section 30-3-3, but rather because Appellant's fault,
primarily Appellant's ongoing and blatant attempt to hide assets, confuse financial
transactions, and otherwise avoid being accountable for his court ordered marital
obligations, an award of fees is appropriate. The point of the award is that in the
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Court's view, a very patient court, is that Appellant made this case much more
difficult than it should have been. Such awards fall within the district court's
inherent powers and do not implicate Utah Code section 30-3-3. See generally
Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, ff 12-14, 985 P.2d 255 (upholding the trial court's
monetary sanction for waste of judicial resources as an exercise of the court's
inherent powers); Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993)
(ff[C]ourts of general jurisdiction . . . possess certain inherent power to impose
monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their conduct thwart the court's scheduling
and movement of cases through the court."). Appellant raises no argument on appeal
that the district court exceeded its inherent powers when it awarded attorney fees
and therefore fails to address the actual basis of the district court's ruling. Under
these circumstances, the appeals court should not disturb the district court's attorney
fees award. Cf. State v. Hurt, 2010 UT App 33, f 16, 227 P.3d 271 (affirming denial
of a suppression motion where appellant failed to acknowledge or address the legal
basis for the district court's ruling).
Instead of basing an award of attorney fees on the factors enumerated in
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 10, as Appellant relies, the court imposes fees based
upon "fault" of the Appellant. The court was imposing fees, at least in part, because
of Appellant's shifting funds between accounts to protect assets. Moreover,
Appellant does not take court orders seriously. Even during the pendency of the
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district court proceeding he withdrew money and purchased a home with his new
girlfriend in Davis County even though he had been court ordered not to withdraw
more than $10,000.00 (Findings p. 13 ).
Appellee requests attorney fees on appeal. "Generally, when fees in a divorce
case are awarded to the prevailing party at the trial court, and that party in turn
prevails on appeal, then fees will also be awarded on appeal." Marshall v. Marshall,
915 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah Ct.App.1996).
CONCLUSION
The District Court correctly and equitably specified which party is responsible
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties that were
contracted or incurred during the marriage. The evidence was presented and the trial
judge should be given great deference in the findings of fact. The decision should
be upheld.
The District Court also ruled correctly and was within its discretion when it
equitably awarded the additional water shares between the parties and its decision
should be upheld.
The District Court correctly determined which investments and retirement
accounts were marital property and divided them equitably between the parties. The
trial court should be given considerable discretion concerning this property division
and its actions enjoy a presumption of validity and are not erroneous.
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The District Court handled itself appropriately throughout the trial and with
the upmost courtesy when it interrogated Appellant after taking judicial notice of a
prior divorce action in Davis County. The Appellant should be held responsible for
his actions.
Lastly, the District Court correctly awarded Appellee's Attorney fees based on
the issue of fault of Appellant's ongoing and blatant attempt to hide assets, confuse
financial transactions, and otherwise avoid being accountable for his court ordered
marital obligations. The Appellant made this case much more difficult than it should
have been.
Appellee asks this Court to uphold the determinations of the District Court, as
set forth above. Further, Appellee requests attorney fees on appeal

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (

day of April, 2011.

Todd D. Gardner
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this / - day of April 2011,1 caused to be HAND
DELIVERED, two (2) true and correct copies including one (1) pdf, read only CD
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following:
Clark Ward
6925 Union Park Center, #600
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant

Todd
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ADDENDUM
Findings of Fact, issued July 2,2010;
Decree of Divorce entered July 15, 2010.
Copy of November 30,2009 Order
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRfc^i^^*IW? < ' , COUR
inird Judicial District
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUL 0 2 2010
\K*7

SALT LAKE COUNTY

ByiSL

Deputy Clc

ANNETTE LISTON,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
RULING AND ORDER

Petitioner,

vs.
SERGAY LISTON,
CASE NO. 084900427
Respondent.

Judge Robert K. Hilder

This divorce action was tried to the Court on June 24 and 25, 2010.
Todd D. Gardner appeared for petitioner and Clark R. Ward appeared for
respondent.
witnesses,

Following
and

advisement.

the testimony of the parties and additional

closing

Having

now

argument,

the

Court

fully considered

took

all

of

the

matter

under

the

evidence

and

applicable law, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact, and
specific Rulings on each of the issues presented by the parties.

The

Findings and the Rulings are intended to provide a sufficient factual and
legal basis for a Decree of Divorce to be prepared by counsel for
petitioner, but

if either counsel believes

additional

Findings are

necessary, they may be included as long as they are supported by the
record and consistent with this Ruling and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1

The parties to this action are both 73 years of age.

They
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originally met during the 9th grade of high school, but they did not marry
until May 20, 2002, after each of the parties had been married and
divorced on two prior occasions.

Before the parties were married, they

lived together commencing approximately 1999, at which time petitioner was
divorced from her second husband, and respondent was still married, but
in the process of obtaining a divorce.
2

Respondent's divorce Decree was entered in January, 2002, and

the parties were married the following May.
3

The parties announced an engagement on New Year's Eve, 1999,

at which time respondent presented petitioner with a wedding/engagement
ring.

It is disputed whether the ring presented at that time included a

substantial diamond at its center.

It is not disputed that the ring as

it now exists does not include a primary diamond, but that it now consists
of small diamond pieces surrounding a cubic zirconium.

The Court cannot

determine whether there was ever a large diamond in the ring, but the
Court does find that respondent either deliberately misled petitioner at
the time of engagement and for several years thereafter into believing
that he had bought her a genuine diamond, or alternatively, respondent had
an original diamond replaced by cubic zirconium

sometime after the

marriage.
4

The Court cannot determine the value of the ring, with or

without a diamond.

The insurance renewal for the ring, which was dated

in 2001, more than a year after the ring was purchased, showed a maximum
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insurance value of $14,000. Respondent recalls that he paid about $475,
which included his wedding band.
5
one.

The parties disagree on whether the marriage was ever a happy

It is agreed that they separated on or about January, 2008.

There

is some dispute over the precise date, but the Court finds that a date of
approximately January 15, 2008, is close to the reality, and sufficient
for the Court's need to establish a date when the marriage effectively
ended.
6

As discussed with counsel at the close of trial, and pursuant'

to the Court's discretion to determine a date for division of property,
debts, and financial assets, the Court will use the January 15, 2008
separation date, rather than the date of trial.

Using this date, the

Court finds that the parties were engaged in a bona fide marriage for
approximately five years and eight months.
that

the parties

lived

separate

The Court specifically finds

lives, both physically

and

in the

management of their finances, from the date of separation.
7

As stated above, the parties disagree as to the essential

happiness of their relationship. The Court finds that petitioner's belief
that the parties were generally happy in their marital association is
correct,

but

it

is

also

true

that

their

happiness

was

marred

by

disagreements regarding inappropriate activities conducted by respondent,
which the Court finds did occur, but which the Court also finds do not
need to be examined in any further detail. The parties engaged in marital
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counseling at various times during the marriage, including in the first
year or so, but the fact of this counseling and the concerns that prompted
the parties to go to counseling, do not play any significant part in the
Court's determination of the issues presented at trial.
8

The Court has reviewed, and taken judicial notice of, the 42

page docket reflecting the course of the divorce case between respondent
and his second wife, which matter was handled in Davis County.

The Court

is also aware that petitioner has been divorced on two prior occasions,
but the Court does not have substantial or detailed information regarding
the cause of those divorces.
9

Based on both the court docket and the testimony of the

parties, primarily respondent's own testimony,
respondent

has very

actively

taken

steps

the Court

to protect

finds that

his

financial

interests, both with respect to the second divorce, and during this
marriage, which is not of itself improper, but the Court finds that
respondent has gone well beyond measures to protect what is legitimately
his.

It is clear from the docket and respondent's own testimony, that he

was willing to undertake any acts, including substantial deception, to
shield assets that should have been available to satisfy claims of his
former wife, which claims were vindicated by Court Judgments.
10
necessary

Respondent claims that his difficult second divorce and his
efforts

appropriate

to protect

his assets are evidence

steps to preserve all separate property

that

he took

in the present
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marriage. The Court disagrees. Despite respondent's prior experiences
regarding marital and separate assets, and whatever his desires, the Court
finds that in many respects he was ineffective in separating and shielding
assets from the reach of petitioner.

For example, respondent alluded to

an "agreement" between the parties to this marriage regarding separate
finances, but no such agreement was written, and neither was any such
agreement conceded by petitioner.
respondent

had

a property

This is so despite the fact that

agreement

in his

second

marriage,

which

agreement apparently was invalidated by the Court. Nevertheless, the Court
finds that respondent understood the option of preparing either a pre- or
post-nuptial agreement to protected or segregate assets, and did not do
so.
11

The Court finds that as part of his effort to protect or hide

assets from the reach of his former spouse, respondent maintained the
majority of his liquid funds in a* Barnes Bank checking account in the name
of his mother, Lorena Liston. The respondent candidly admitted that none
of those funds actually belonged to his mother, although some of them may
have been received initially as gifts from his mother. Nevertheless, the
Lorena Liston account, which was a fiction invented to obscure and shield
respondent's financial dealings, was in fact respondent's primary account
during much of the parties' relationship. Among other deposits into that
account, respondent routinely deposited earnings from his freelance work
as a consultant/engineer.

These deposits represented marital earnings,
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which were deposited into an account controlled solely by respondent,
12

During the marriage, the parties did keep separate financial

accounts, but the Court finds that the fact that the accounts were in one
or the other sole name does not mean that the parties' finances were not
combined in substantial ways.

For example, both parties had individual

credit cards, which cards were used for the entire range of expenses and
purchases,

including

items purchased

for the

purchased for the benefit of the household.

individual,

and

items

As a general rule, items

purchased generally throughout the course of a marriage, particularly
including food, clothing, utilities, and all of the usual expenses of dayto-day living, are considered marital expenses, not subject to scrutiny
or allocation after the parties divorce or separate.
13

In this case, the evidence is persuasive that petitioner

incurred debt related to family expenses in the amount of at least
$30,500, which debt was unpaid at the time of separation.

Except for a

disputed item regarding purchase of a motor vehicle, there is no evidence
to

suggest

that

any

purchases

on

the

account

at

issue

were

for

petitioner's individual benefit or that those purchases resulted in
acquisition of individual property that should be addressed in an ultimate
personal property allocation by this Court.
14

The transaction raised by respondent relates to an undisputed

purchase of a motor vehicle for about $10,000, which amount was charged
to a credit card while it was bearing zero interest. Petitioner testifies
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that the debt was paid off before the parties separated, and it is not
part of the $30,500 debt balance she took at the time of separation.
Respondent claims that by check number 282 from the Lorena Liston account,
in the amount of $10,900, he in fact paid off that debt.

The Court has

examined the check at issue carefully, and agrees with petitioner that the
memo entry, in respondent's handwriting,
purchase payment.

The

Court

believes

petitioner believes that word is

refers to a home or house
the

first

word

is '"house,"

%%

home," but regardless of the precise

word, there is no suggestion on the check that it related to a vehicle
purchase or debt payment.

Furthermore, even if respondent used funds to

pay off a debt on his wife's credit card, more than two years before the
parties separated, which sum is not a part of the $30,500 debt that
petitioner seeks to divide between the parties, there is no basis for the
Court to second guess the motive for that payment during the marriage.
15

The Court finds that the vehicle that was paid off during the

marriage was traded in on a new vehicle for petitioner, at the insistence
of petitioner's daughter, who the Court finds paid the remainder of the
cost of the new vehicle.
16

The new vehicle

in question

petitioner's present vehicle.

is a 2005

Subaru,

which

is

Respondent claims an interest in this

vehicle, as marital property. Apart from the fact that respondent asserts
what this Court deems to be an inflated present value for the Subaru, the
Court finds that the evidence is clear that except for the $3,400 down-
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payment, which came from marital funds, the vehicle was a gift to
petitioner, which gift was never converted to marital property.
Having determined the foregoing facts, the Court now turns to its
rulings on each of the specific issues submitted to it, which rulings will
include by necessity additional specific findings:
Grounds and Jurisdiction
The Court

finds

from the evidence

that the parties were both

residents of Salt Lake County at least 90 days before the filing of this
matter, although respondent is now a resident in Davis County. Therefore,
the Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. It
is

apparent

from

the

evidence

that

the

parties

have

suffered

irreconcilable differences, such that the marriage cannot be preserved,
and they should be awarded

a divorce on grounds

of

irreconcilable

differences.
Petitioner's surname
Petitioner has asked to be restored to the use of her prior surname;
to wit: Lindsay.

She should be permitted to change her name to Lindsay

upon execution of the Decree of Divorce in this matter.
Real Property
The parties initially lived in a mobile home (to be addressed in the
personal property section below) but within a few months of marriage, they
moved into a house on approximately one acre of land located at 1835
Gunderson Lane in Salt Lake County. There was argument at trial about
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whether the property was in fact marital, but that issue has been almost
entirely resolved by a mediation agreement that both parties submitted to
the Court to resolve the real property issue, except for the disputed
issue of water shares.

Nevertheless, the Court is concerned that there

may be lingering doubts about whether the property was in fact marital.
In the event that is the case, the Court now states its findings and
conclusions that both parties contributed to the down payment on the
house.

The amounts may have been similar, if a loan from respondent's

mother is excluded, but regardless, they each contributed at least $8,000,
and the fact that petitioner's contribution was in the form of foregoing
her real estate commission is of no consequence, because that was money
to which she was fully entitled.

In addition, mortgages were paid by

respondent, but out of an account from which he paid numerous household
expenses, and which account received money that could only be considered
marital property.

Both parties worked to maximize the value of the

property and accomplish a subdivision, which they did successfully.

All

of these factors make it clear to the Court that the property was marital.
The

foregoing

determination

is apparently

consistent

with

the

parties' conduct in negotiating a settlement of any interest petitioner
may have in the property at the time of mediation. The agreement that was
received by stipulation makes it clear that petitioner should receive
$10,000 upon execution of a Quit-Claim Deed.
or when that Deed was executed.

There is a dispute whether

Regardless, that is an act that still
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The Court finds that the $10,000 was consideration for

petitioner giving up all interest in the real property on Gunderson Lane.
The real property included shares in Holliday Water Company, one of which
shares the Court

finds was, in fact, appurtenant

to the property.

Subsequent to the subdivision, and at the time of the mediation agreement,
there were four shares in Holliday Water Company which are related to the
real property.

Based on the testimony of the Holliday Water Company

Manager, which the Court found to be persuasive, the Court finds that only
one of the four shares is in fact appurtenant to the property.

More

specifically, this share is tied to the single meter on the property
titled in the parties' names, and is absolutely necessary to permit the
property owner to receive culinary water from Holliday Water Company.
The remaining three shares are undisputedly valued at $5,000 each.
Those shares represent three of the total 7,200 shares issued by the Water
Company. The value of those shares is that installation of a meter in any
of the areas served by Holliday Water Company must be tied to a single
share of stock for service to be provided. Accordingly, there is a market
for individual shares as property owners add water service.

The other

value of the shares is that for each share held, the owner is entitled to
60,000 gallons of free water each year, perhaps twenty percent of the
modest requirements of one family.

At current rates, that benefit is

worth about $63 per year, and the Court finds, consistent with the
testimony of the Manager, that the real value of a share is in the ability
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to obtain a new service to a new meter, and not the ability to obtain an
additional 60,000 gallons of water per year,, without charge.
The Court determines that the three non-appurtenant water shares
were

not

covered

by

the

mediation

agreement

petitioner's interest in the real property.
property, with a total value of $15,000.

for

satisfaction

of

Those shares are marital

Respondent shall be ordered to

pay to petitioner the total sum of $7,500 for her half interest in the
shares, or he may alternatively transfer one share to petitioner, and pay
$2,500 to equalize the division. Petitioner is ordered to execute a QuitClaim Deed as soon as possible in exchange for the yet to be tendered
payment of $10,000 as provided by the mediation agreement.
Marital debts
The Court does not see where respondent identified any marital debts
for allocation.

Petitioner has established debts of at least $30,500,

which sum the Court finds to be supported sufficiently by the evidence.
The Court finds that there is no evidence supporting any argument that
petitioner incurred the $30,500 for her exclusive benefit, or that the
parties did not benefit through the course of the marriage from her
expenditures.

Petitioner did not have the income to support many of the

expenses she was called upon to pay in the marriage.

It is true that

petitioner terminated full-time work, and cut back substantially on her
part-time working activities, but at the time of the marriage each of the
parties was 65 years old.

There was no agreement or requirement that
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petitioner would continue to work, and until the parties' marriage, while
they were

living

together,

respondent paid virtually

all of

their

expenses.
During the marriage, petitioner paid for many day-to-day expenses,
including food, entertainment, Christmas for families, and travel.

The

Court is not determining that she paid all of these expenses, but she made
substantial payments towards these items. For the foregoing reasons, the
Court finds that the $30,500 in debt as of the date of separation in
January, 2008, is a marital obligation, to be shared equally.

Respondent

shall be ordered to pay $15,250 to petitioner to satisfy his share of the
marital debt.

The Court finds that the debt is in fact outstanding for

one or more credit cards, none of which bear respondent's name, and he
should have no liability therefor.

Nevertheless, in the event there

should be any claim made against respondent by a creditor for said debt,
petitioner shall be ordered to indemnify and hold him harmless therefrom
after respondent pays his $15,250 allocation.
Petitioner's Motion for Protective Order and Motion for Order to
Show Cause Regarding Use of Assets

There are two proceedings that occurred during the pendency of
this action that give rise to opposing claims for attorney fee
reimbursement.

In June, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for a

Protective Order, in which

she alleged she was in fear of respondent,

specifically based on what she perceived as a threat contained in a
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letter respondent wrote to her attorney approximately one week prior.
The Petition was unsuccessful, but this Court determined, as stated
during trial, that as to the core issue of fear, and the existence of
an implied threat by respondent, implying the potential use of force,
including using deadly force, the allegations were not manifestly
untrue.

This Court does not second guess the determination of the

Court that denied the Protective Order, but neither can this Court find
that there is any basis for an award of attorney's fees based solely on
the fact that the Order was dismissed.
On the other hand, the parties were clearly engaged in efforts to
protect assets during the pendency of the action.

Respondent was

ordered to not use more than $10,000 each month from the various
investment accounts he controlled, but in August, 2009, respondent
withdrew about $195,000 to purchase his present home.

It is true that

respondent gave notice of this intention, through his counsel, but
respondent's notice was mere lip service.

That is, he gave notice to

his counsel, counsel acted promptly to convey the notice and a request
for an exception to the Order to petitioner's counsel, imposing a very
short deadline, but respondent went ahead and completed the transaction
without waiting for that date to pass.
Respondent's main response to criticism of his actions is that he
had a good faith belief that the money was his.

In fact, he almost

certainly did have a right to the sum he withdrew, and more, at the
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appropriate time, but such belief, right or wrong, does not justify
respondent in ignoring a Court Order.

There is no request for a

finding of contempt, and none will be made, but the Court does find
that respondent should reimburse petitioner the amount of $500 as a
reasonable amount for attorney's fees incurred in relation to this
matter.

Such award shall be in addition to any other attorney's fee

award that may be granted herein.
Investment and Retirement Accounts
Respondent has accumulated various monies over the years,
including before this marriage, which are held in a series of Fidelity
Investment accounts.

During the marriage some accounts have been

closed, some funds have been transferred, and others have been
combined, resulting in the necessity for the Court to unravel separate
and marital property for division as part of this divorce action.
The Court was greatly aided in this task by the analysis and
testimony of Rebecca Schreyer, CPA, but the Court also applied its own
legal analysis and application of the facts to modify the recommended
allocation provided by Ms. Schreyer.

The Court concludes that Ms.

Schreyer's initial analysis, set forth in her letter of December 18,
2009 (petitioner's Exhibit 28) provides the best starting point.
First, the Court agrees with the ultimate determination that
respondent's rollover IRA account ending in the numbers 3460 was
respondent's premarital property, with no additions or reductions
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during the period of May 2, 2002 through January 15, 2008, which dates
the Court finds to be appropriate for analysis.

Accordingly, any

amounts in that account are respondent's sole property.
The Court also agrees that account number ending in the digits
5706, and the balance of $72,065.66 at the time of marriage, were
premarital property.

There is a tenable argument that subsequent

activity in this account could convert the entire account to marital
property, but petitioner does not urge that position strongly, and the
Court agrees that her forbearance from so doing is consistent with an
equitable approach to this account,

starting on October 30, 2002,

however, funds were added to that account in the total of $77,559.89
all of which funds were added during the marriage.

Respondent claims

that some or all of those funds came from his mother, as a gift.

There

is one exception, a check for $4,500 dated March 23, 2004, which came
from

respondent's business account.

Such sum is clearly marital

property.
With respect to the other sums that respondent claims came from
his mother, he proffers no documentary evidence or other evidence that
would support his claim.

Even if the Court was inclined to believe

those sums might have come as a separate gift, subsequent actions
involving this account, combined with the lack of evidence recording
the source of the funds, persuade the Court that all of these amounts
should be treated as marital funds.

With these additions, the account
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grew to $161,984.31, and the entire amount was transferred to an
account ending in the number 3162, which account was in petitioner's
sole name.
Respondent admits that he made that transfer, and claims without
any apparent understanding of the irony of the situation, that he did
so to protect the money from garnishment for sums due to his second
wife, pursuant to judgments in Davis County.

That transfer occurred on

June 1, 2004, and about six months later the money in account ending
3162 was transferred to account ending 7442, which respondent opened,
this time in his mother's name.

The Court does not believe that

respondent claims that the money was in fact his mother's, but even if
he made such a claim, it is clear to the Court that the use of his
mother's name on this Fidelity account (7442) was simply another device
to protect money, either from his second wife, or from petitioner.
This series of transactions leads the Court to further analysis focused
on the funds in account ending 7442.
The amount transferred from account 3162 in petitioner's name, to
7442, in Lorena Liston's name, was $169,415.85.
in January, 2005.

The transfer occurred

Account 7442 was opened in November 2004 with a

$30,000 deposit, check number 208, from the Lorena Liston account,
maintained solely by respondent, for his benefit.

Respondent claims

that these were not marital funds, but the Court has already determined
that this was the account in which respondent channeled all of his day-
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to-day income and expenses, including his marital earnings, which were
substantial during this time period.

The Court does not have any doubt

that the $30,000 that funded the account initially, and subsequent
deposits in the total amount of $95,000 ($90,000 from the personal
account in the name of Lorena Liston, from May 2005 through March 2006,
and $5,000 from respondent's business account, which funneled business
earnings, on May 2, 2005) comprise marital property.

Accordingly, the

only difference the Court has with Ms. Schreyer on her accounting of
deposits to account 7442 from 29 November, 2004 through 15 March, 2006,
is that she apparently omitted the $5,000 business account deposit.
The Court notes at this point that none of the accounts discussed
thus far include retirement funds, except for the account that has been
determined to be separate property.
The Court's analysis now comes to another difference with Ms.
Schreyer.

Ms. Schreyer identifies account number ending 2680 as a

retirement account, which opened on April 1, 2002 with a balance of
$123,215.12.

She looks at a deposit in November of 2006, and a

transfer to account 5584, in December 2007, and assumes that the entire
marital portion of the IRA account 2680 was transferred into account
5584.

Ms. Schreyer then identifies a balance of $24,924.97, which was

transferred in March, 2008, to account ending 5385, which is the last
account that appears to have held the funds, based on the evidence
available at trial.
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After hearing the evidence of all of the parties, the Court
determines that the funds held in account 2680, and the transactions
discussed by Ms. Schreyer, do not in fact constitute either receipt or
transfer of marital funds.

This account is determined to be entirely

the property of respondent, and the transfer of $24,924.97 into account
5584, is determined to be separate property owned by respondent.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court adjusts the calculation
on page 2 of Ms. Schreyer's letter (petitioner's Exhibit 28), by
deducting $19,924.97 from the balance in account 5385 as shown on the
Exhibit.

This sum is reached by subtracting $24,924.97, and adding the

$5,000 from the business check deposit during the term of the marriage
that was not included by Ms. Schreyer.
made.

One more adjustment needs to be

The Court deducts the $97,027 premarital value, resulting in a

marital interest at the time of separation in the amount of $273,563,
but the Court further reduces that sum by $513, to $273,050.

The

reason for this final deduction is that Ms. Schreyer's analysis
included growth in the fund. The Court applied the percentage of the
total that represented growth, and determined the difference between
the growth on the amount determined by Ms. Schreyer ($293,558) and the
amount determined by the Court ($273,050).
Based on all of the foregoing, the Court determines that
petitioner shall be awarded as her marital interest in investment
accounts the total sum of $136,525.

The Court notes that based on the
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records presented at trial, this sum is available and held in nonretirement funds, and the Court finds no basis to determine that
petitioner does in fact have any interest in designated retirement
funds, which funds to the extent they still exist should be awarded in
their entirety to respondent.
Personal Property
The personal property issues present some difficulties, but more
based on the emotional component issues than the numbers or
characterization of property.

Both parties feel that they have been

treated unfairly by the other, and that certain property awards should
be made in the interest of fairness, and to validate each party's
subjective belief regarding that fairness.

The Court will do its best

to address those issues in turn, and briefly:
(a)

Mobile home.

The first item is the mobile home in

which petitioner is living, as well as a second mobile home she owns.
Both of those mobile homes are premarital property; there is a credible
claim that petitioner holds one of homes in constructive trust for her
brother; and the value is likely less than respondent asserts, and not
substantial. Because the Court finds that respondent has no interest in
the properties, they are awarded to petitioner, with no final
determination of value.
(b)

Hollidav Water Shares.

These shares have already been

addressed in connection with real property, and shall be allocated as
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set forth herein.
(c)

Violins.

The Court is persuaded that respondent has

spent substantial sums purchasing violins during the marriage, but the
unrebutted testimony is that he did so from funds received through
selling or trading other property that was indisputably premarital.
Respondent shall retain all violins with no compensation to petitioner.
(d)

Engagement/wedding ring.

Petitioner is awarded the

wedding ring in its present condition, without any credit to
respondent.

The ring was a gift.

The Court must find that the

petitioner has not met her burden of showing that there was a diamond
in the ring when it was given to her, although it is admitted that
there is no diamond in the ring now.

Even if petitioner did in fact

meet her burden of showing it was a diamond, she has failed in her
burden to establish the value of the ring, including a diamond.
Regardless of what the ring once was, it was a gift to petitioner, it
is in her possession, and she may retain it without any credit to
respondent.
(e)

2005 Subaru Legacy Outback.

This vehicle-is

petitioner's sole property, except for the contribution of the down
payment of the marital vehicle.

That sum was $3,400.

This Court is

unaware of any principle that would require it to award a share in the
full amount of the down payment, because the value of the traded
vehicle and the new vehicle both depreciated before separation, but the
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Court finds it equitable that respondent should receive $1,000 as
compensation for the trade-in from the vehicle purchased during the
marriage from marital funds.
(f)

Premarital property owned bv respondent.

The Court

finds that a number of items, including all of the older vehicles, are
respondent's sole property.

They include the 1963 Chevrolet pickup,

the 1942 Pord, and other older vehicles and engines, etc., that were
listed at trial, whether they are in their current form, or whether
that asset has been sold and replaced with other assets.

Unless

specifically stated herein, petitioner has no interest in any such
assets.
(g)

Miscellaneous property«

Each of the parties shall be

awarded the general furniture, televisions and other such items in
their possession.

These items do not have substantial value, they are

no longer necessary for day-to-day living, and no value should be
ascribed.

The Court is concerned about the cavalier disregard shown by

respondent in the lack of care taken for certain furniture items owned
by petitioner, but petitioner also took too long in following through
to pick up those items.

Based on the values at issue, the amount of

funds already divided herein, and because the only basis to award
compensation to petitioner for these items would be essentially
punitive, which the Court is unwilling to resort to on these issues,
the parties will simply be awarded furniture and other items in their
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The Court, in fact,

believes that the parties have come out very even in terms of the
distribution of the relatively nominal personal property that was
marital.
Alimony
Alimony is a difficult issue in this case in some ways. Neither
party, both of whom are now retired, has sufficient income, excluding
any potential investment income, to support the lifestyle they enjoyed
during the marriage. Both, however, will have investment funds
following the allocation decided herein, which will provide the ability
to do two things: One, the parties, particularly petitioner, will have
the ability to pay off all consumer debt, thus reducing her monthly
expenses very substantially. Petitioner will also receive a
contribution from respondent to pay of marital debt. Second, any sums
remaining after debt reduction may be used to generate modest return.
The Court may not invade the individual funds remaining after
allocation of all property to provide alimony assistance except in
extreme cases, and the Court cannot make any such determination in this
case. This is particularly true in light of the age of both parties and
the relatively short marriage. For these reasons, no alimony will be
awarded.
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Attorney's fees
Based on the awards set forth above, the Court does not find that
either party has an inability to pay fees incurred, but the Court finds
that based on the issue of fault, primarily respondent's ongoing and
blatant attempts to hide assets, confuse financial transactions, and
otherwise avoid being accountable for his Court Ordered and marital
obligations, an award of fees is appropriate.

The point of the award

is that in the Court's view, respondent has made this case much more
difficult than it should have been.

Both of the attorneys in this case

are very able and they have acted with the utmost integrity and
professionalism.

Neither is asserting a claim for attorney's fees in

any amount close to what could be justified given the complexity of
what should have been a much more simple case.

Nevertheless, the Court

finds that it is completely fair and equitable that respondent be
required to pay the sum of $5,000 to petitioner's attorney as partial
compensation for the many hours of work and effort that have gone into
bringing this matter to conclusion.
CONCLUSION
Counsel for petitioner is directed to prepare a final Decree
consistent with the Findings and Rulings set forth herein.

This

document may serve as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for
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that purpose.
Dated this 2nd day of July, 2010.
By the Court:

RULING AND ORDER
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the

<7
foregoing Ruling and Order, to the following, this L~
2010:
Todd D. Gardner
Attorney for Petitioner
4120 S. Highland Drive, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Clark R. Ward
Attorney for Respondent
6925 Union Park Avenue, Suite 600
Midvale, Utah 84047

duly
day of />3*nfe,

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Todd D.Gardner (#5953)
BATEMAN, GOODWIN & GARDNER
4120 South Highland Drive, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: (801)424-3451
Facsimile: (801)424-3429

JUL 1 5 2010
SALTL^CQyNTY
Deputy Cleric

Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANNETTE LISTON,
Petitioner,

DECREE OF DIVORCE
:

vs.
SERGAY LISTON,
Respondent.

:

Case No. 084900427

:

Judge: Robert K. Hilder

The above-entitled matter came before the court and was tried June 24 and June 25, 2010.
Petitioner was represented by Todd D. Gardner and Respondent was represented by Clark R. Ward. The
Court, having found and entered its Findings of Fact, Ruling and Order on July 2,2010, and that document
being incorporated by reference as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter and being
otherwise fully advised, it is hereby
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce upon the grounds of of irreconcilable differences to

become final upon entry of this decree.
2. Petitioner shall be returned to her former surname; to wit: Lindsay
3. Respondent shall pay to Petitioner $15,250 to satisfy his share of the marital debt. In the event
that there should be a claim made against Respondent by a creditor for said debt, Petitioner shall indemnify
and hold harmless Respondent therefrom after Respondent pays his $15,250.00 allocation of marital debt.
4. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a home and real property located at
1835 Gunderson Lane in Salt Lake County, Utah. That real property, pursuant to the Mediation Agreement
the parties entered into December 2, 2009, shall be awarded to Respondent. Respondent shall pay to
Petitioner $10,000.00 for her interest in the marital home upon Petitioner signing a quit claim deed
conveying her interest in the property to Respondent.
5. Respondent shall pay to petitioner the total of $7,500.00 for her half interest in the three nonappurtenant water shares that the parties own with Holliday Water Company.

Respondent may

alternatively transfer one share to Petitioner and pay and additional $2,500.00 to Petitioner to equalize
distribution.
6. No alimony shall be awarded in this matter.
7. Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner the amount of $500.00 as a reasonable amount of
attorney's fees incurred by Petitioner having to enforce and Respondent violating the $10,000.00 per month
investment withdrawal limits as ordered by the court during the pendency of this action.
8. Petitioner shall be awarded as her marital interest from the parties investment accounts in the
the total amount of $136,525.00.

9. Petitioner shall be awarded the interest in her mobile home that she may have without any claim
by Respondent.
10. Respondent shall retain all violins without compensation to Petitioner.
11. Petitioner shall be awarded her wedding ring in its present condition.
12. Respondent shall receive from Petitioner $1,000.00 as compensation from the trade-in from the
2005 Subaru Legacy Outback purchased during the marriage from marital funds.
13. Petitioner shall have no interest in the 1963 Chevrolet Pick-Up, the 1942 Ford and other older
vehicles and engines, etc. that were listed at trial.
14. An additional award of $5,000.00 shall be paid by Respondent to Petitioner's attorney as
additional compensation for attorney's fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this / • ?

day of

,2010.

BY THE COURT

Robert K.'Hilder
THIRD DISTRICT
Approved as to Form:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

This is to certify that on this ^
_ day of
h/->*-<
2010, that I caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECIDE OF DIVORCE to the following:
Clark R. Ward
6925 Union Park Avenue, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84124

Todd D Gardner

Third Judicial DiWicV
Todd D. Gardner (#5953)
BATEMAN. GOODWIN & GARDNER
4120 South Highland Drive, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: (801)424-3451
Facsimile: (801)424-3429
AttorneyforPetitioner
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANNETTE LISTON,

ORDER

Petitioner,
vs.
Case No. 084900427

SERGAY LISTON,

Judge: Hikter
Comm: Blomquist

Respondent

On October 30,2009, came before the court, Commissioner Michael Evans presiding on
behalf of Commissioner Blomquist, Petitioner's Motion. Petitioner was present with her attorney
Todd D. Gardner, and Respondent was present with his attorney Clark Ward. The parties met
prior to the hearing and entered into a stipulation and placed it on the record before
Commissioner Evans. The Court therefore, hereby makes me following Orders:
1.

The court orders ADR between the parties if it can occur on or before December 3,2009.
Thereafter, the parties are excused from me ADR requirement.

2.

The marital home located on Gunderson Lane shall be appraised for valuation by a qualified
appraiser agreed upon by the parties as soon as possible. The Petitioner shall pay for the
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appraisal but the parties agree that the appraisal fee may be apportioned at a later hearing if
the Petitioner decides that is necessary.
3.

The appraiser should be agreed upon and named by the parties no later than 14 days from
the date of this Order or the parties shall come back before the court to submit names
before the court and allow the court to decide who the appraiser will be.

4.

The named appraiser shall submit the appraisal report to the parties after he or she has
determined an appraised value of the home. The parties will accept the determination of
the appraised value as indicative of the value and agree not to oppose the determined value
of the appraisal, except for good cause shown by the parties within 10 days of the appraisal
report to the court and the parties.

5.

After the appraised value has been detennined, the parties shall either agree to purchase
the home by paying the other party what their equity in the home would be according to
the new appraisal. The equity, if any, should be determined on a 50/50 basis, after
deducting traditional impounds, liens, mortgage loans, real estate fees, taxes, closing costs
and the like. The purchasing party shall give notice to the other party of their intent to
purchase out the other's equity in the marital home within 14 days of the appraisal report
and shall close within 60 days from the date of the final appraisal report.

Or, if both

parties desire to purchase the marital home and cannot determine which party is to prevail
in the purchase of the marital home, or if no party wishes to purchase the marital home,
then the home shall be placed for sale with a qualified real estate agent and sold forthwith.
6.

The home, if not purchased by either party, shall be placed on the open real estate market
with a qualified real estate agent that both parties agree upon. If the parties cannot decide
on a qualified real estate agent then the parties shall hold another hearing to submit names
before the court and allow die court to decide. The real estate agent named shall sell the
2

home at the appraised amount or higher or lower if it is the real estate agent's belief that
the amount should be higher or lower due to the prevailing market conditions. The parties
will accept the determination of the real estate agent's valuation and marketing skills as
reasonable and agree not to oppose the determined value or marketing skills except for
good cause as presented to the court. Upon sale of the marital home, the equity, if any,
should be divided between the parties on a 50/50 basis, after deducting traditional
impounds, liens, mortgage loans, real estate fees, taxes, closing costs and the like.
Respondent is ordered to provide to Petitioner's counsel all of his current banking and
financial statements including, but not limited to, Bank of America and Fidelity
Investments within 14 days of this Order. These statements shall go back to at least July
2009 to the present.
Respondent is ordered to provide to Petitioner's counsel all of his agreement's, closing
documents, and contracts regarding the purchase of his home in Davis County within 14
days of this Order.
Respondent is ordered to provide to Petitioner's counsel a copy of a recent appraisal he
had done on the parties Gunderson Lane home. The appraisal is also due within 14 days of
this Order.
A qualified CPA shall be named by the parties to determine the fair market value the
parties investments and banking accounts that are in either of their names, the names of
third parties that are marital assets as determined by the CPA, including, but not limited to,
Fidelity Accounts, Bank of America Accounts and accounts that are attributable to the
marital estate. The Petitioner agrees to pay for the up-front fees of the CPA, but reserves
the right to petition the court to apportion fees with Respondent if she determines that to
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be necessary. The CPA shall be agreed upon and named by the parties no later than 14
days from the date of this Order or the parties will hold another hearing to submit names
before the court and allow the court to decide.
11.

The named CPA shall have at his or her disposal all statements, invoices, reports,
printouts, or papers, necessary to make his or her determination of the value of the marital
estate. The parties shall cooperate fully in this regard and supply the CPA with all
requested information.

12.

The CPA shall submit a report to the parties after he or she has determined a value of the
various investment and banking accounts. The parties agree to accept the determination of
the value as indicative of the value and agree not to oppose the value determined by the
CPA except for good and reasonable cause before the court

13.

The CPA shall determine the following: 1).

The Value of all assets, banking and

investment accounts held by each of the parties prior to their marriage 2). The value of all
assets, investment/banking accounts held in die various accounts during the course of the
marriage 3). The value of the account as of January 15, 2008 and 4) the value of the
accounts as of the date of the report issued by the CPA.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ^b^

day of A/Q^

2009.

^OF^;X

"Judge Robert K. Hilder
Third District Court

Recommended By:

\^JUbU
raa*A^ #0i
Commissioner Evans
D

(On the bench for
Commission Blomquist)

Approved as to Form:

Dated:
Clark Ward

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER was served via first class U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, on the

/

day of November, 2009, to:

Clark R Ward
6925 Union Park Ave, #600
Midvale, Utah 84047

Todd D. Gardner
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